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Abstract 
Since there are no broadly accepted macro-level estimations for the size of the hidden 
economy, the interrelationships of the hidden economy with different segments of the 
labor market have to be approached in a number of different ways. In our cross-country 
analysis, in parts 2 and 3 we use indirect estimations of the hidden economy and show 
that the size of the hidden economy and the size of self-employment can be explained by 
similar explanatory variables, tax rates and corruption being prominent among them. In 
part 4 we set up and quantify a model to analyze the interrelationships among the 
hidden economy and the pools of self-employed and non-employed people. For this 
model we use a specific direct indicator of the hidden economy, the concealed 
consumption share which is derived from the notion of the non-observed economy used 
by statistical agencies. We show that the size of this part of the hidden economy is 
determined by the tax rate related to the consumption and the level of corruption. We 
also demonstrate that the concealed consumption share plays an important role in the 
determination of the size of various segments of the labor market, while the 
developments of these segments also have their impact on this specific part of the hidden 
economy.  
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A rejtett gazdaság nagyságáról nem rendelkezünk széles körben elfogadott makroszintű 
becslésekkel, ezért ennek és a többi munkaerőpiaci szegmensnek az egymásra hatását 
többféle megközelítésben tárgyaljuk. A dolgozat 2. és 3. részében országok közötti 
keresztmetszeti elemzésben a rejtett gazdaság nagyságának indirekt becsléseit 
használjuk, és megmutatjuk, hogy a rejtett gazdaság és az önfoglalkoztató szektor 
méretének országok közötti különbségei több azonos magyarázó változóval, köztük 
kiemelten az adóráták és a korrupció szintjével magyarázhatók. A 4. részben felállítunk 
és számszerűsítünk egy modellt, amely a rejtett gazdaság, az önfoglalkoztatók és a nem-
foglalkoztatottak szektorainak egymásrahatását elemzi. Ebben a modellben a rejtett 
gazdaságot egy speciális indikátorral, a be nem vallott fogyasztás arányával jellemezzük, 
amelyet kidolgozói a statisztikai hivatalok által becsült un. nem-megfigyelt gazdaság 
fogalmából vezettek le. Megmutatjuk, hogy a rejtett gazdaságnak ez a része is szoros 
kapcsolatot mutat a fogyasztással kapcsolatos adóráták és a korrupció szintjeivel. Azt is 
felvázoljuk, hogy a be nem vallott fogyasztás aránya fontos szerepet játszik a különböző 
munkapiaci szegmensek alakulásában, míg ez utóbbiak maguk is hatással vannak a be 
nem vallott fogyasztásra.   
 
Tárgyszavak: 
Rejtett gazdaság, munkapiac, adózás, korrupció  
  5
1 INTRODUCTION 
The working of hidden, shadow or non-observed economies is reflected in the respective 
labour markets; these (partly overlapping) invisible parts of the national economy do not 
leave the various segments of the labour market untouched. The relationship between 
the hidden economy and the various segments of the labour market is very complex. The 
hidden economy is mostly associated with hidden employment, but this hidden 
employment can be found not only among the officially inactive and unemployed people, 
but among the self-employed people and the employees as well. While we experience 
these features in our own everyday life, an exact, rigorous investigation of this 
relationship is very difficult to carry out. The analysis is difficult at the micro level, 
because here the researcher has to put sensitive questions to representatives of various 
groups engaged in the labour market. It is rather difficult to ask all people (unemployed, 
self-employed, employees or inactive) about activities they are carrying out without 
declaration at the different offices and without paying taxes.   
 
The macro investigation of the relationship between the size of the hidden economy 
and the size of the different segments of the labour market is also difficult, because due 
to its invisible feature and heterogeneity a good and comprehensive definition and 
method of measurement of the hidden economy are missing.  In the literature we can 
find various macro-estimations for the size of the hidden economy in many countries, 
but these results are rather unreliable, and many of them contradict to each other. This 
lack of reliable indicators of the hidden economy is the reason why so far very few 
empirical investigations have been carried out about the direct relationships between the 
size of the hidden economy and various segments of the visible labour market.  
 
Recently, in the investigation of the above mentioned relationships statistical 
estimations of the non-observed economy in the GDP1 h a v e  g a i n e d  p r i o r i t y .   T h e  
                                                        
1 Non-observed economy includes:  
• underground production, defined as those activities that are productive and legal but are 
deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes or complying 
with regulations; 
• illegal production, defined as those productive activities that generate goods and services 
forbidden by law or that are unlawful when carried out by unauthorized producers; 
• informal sector production, defined as those productive activities conducted by unincorporated 
enterprises in the household sector that are unregistered and/or are less than a specified size 
in terms of employment, and that have some market production;  
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problem is that despite the fact that national statistical offices make their estimations 
about the non-observed economy, we have little information about the exact size of the 
non-observed economy already taken into account of in the published figures of GDP. It 
is interesting that although the statistical offices of many countries make estimations for 
the non-observed economy in different branches, they do not know, or do not make it 
public, what the size of the GDP they consider as non-observed at the macro level. 
Recently different international projects made calculations on how much is the exact 
non-observed economy part in the GDP in certain countries. UNECE (2002) presents 
some results of its own international project. The results are presented in Table 1.                                                
[Table 1] 
While one may question the reliability and comprehensiveness of these indicators for 
the size of the hidden economy in the given countries, in this paper in the introductory 
section we will make use of these very data. The justification for this is that most of the 
other available estimations for the hidden economy suffer from a built-in dependency on 
the tax rates and employment patterns; therefore they could not be used for the analysis 
of taxes and labour markets without the risk of arriving at tautological relationships. 
 
We carry out a cross-country macro level investigation. The first logical hypothesis is 
that a larger non-observed economy in the GDP is likely to be associated with a lower 
registered employment rate, because from among the different categories of 
employment, formally employed people have the least time to work in a hidden way. 
There are countries, however, where an unusually large number of employed people are 
declared as working for a minimum wage. This, as a rule, implies that they work partly in 
the formal economy (for the minimum wage) and partly in the hidden economy (for 
undeclared compensation). This is the case, for example, with the so called grey economy 
in Hungary.  If this phenomenon is widespread across countries, then the above 
mentioned hypothesis may not receive a very strong support.   
 
When investigating the relationship between the share of non-observed economy in 
the GDP and total employment rate in 12 countries (7 transition and 5 developed market 
economies), we find a rather strong correlation with a negative sign. As can be seen in 
Figure 1 a higher share of non-observed economy in the GDP is associated with lower 
                                                                                                                                                                     
• production of households for own final use, defined as those productive activities that result in goods 
or services consumed or capitalised by the households that produced them.  
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employment rate in the formal economy. (Due to lack of data, here we excluded Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan from among the countries listed in Table 1. Data are for 
various years in the period 1995-2000.)   
                                                                [Figure 1] 
 
This relationship is especially strong for the employment rate of the low-skilled:  see 
Figure 2. (Here we have only 9 countries in our sample, but we can confirm that the 
stronger relationship for data in Figure 2 is not due to the smaller sample, because the R2 
between the total employment rate and the share of non-observed economy in this 
sample would be 0.595, very similar to the one experienced for data in Figure 1.)   
                                                                [Figure 2]   
While the negative relationship between employment rates and the share of the non-
observed economy in GDP is rather clear in Figure 1 and 2, we have to admit that the 
number of observations does not provide enough evidence to support our hypothesis. At 
the same time the association of high non-observed economy with low employment and 
vice versa does not necessarily prove a causal relationship between the two variables.  
 
Nevertheless, due to lack of credible data for the hidden economy we need this type 
of direct relationship as guidance to further investigations. The same problem of lack of 
data induced researchers to try finding indirect relationships between the size of the 
hidden economy and different indicators about various segments of the labour market. 
The investigation of the indirect relationships between the hidden economy and different 
segments of the labour market usually tries to show that the factors influencing the 
hidden economy simultaneously influence employment, and the structure of 
employment, including unemployment as well. These investigations analyze the effect of 
the hidden economy indirectly, i.e. without any robust information about the size of the 
hidden economy (see Lackó, 2004, 2005, 2006, Boeri and Garibaldi, 2000). 
 
In section 2 the effects of tax rates and corruption on the size of the hidden economy 
is analyzed based on different indirect estimations of the hidden economy. Section 3 
investigates the international evolution of self-employment rates with partly similar 
explanatory factors as it was done for the hidden economy in section 2. Section 4 sets up 
and quantifies a model to analyze the interrelationships among the hidden economy, the 
pool of self-employed and non-employed people. In this section we use a specific  
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indicator of the hidden economy, the concealed consumption share which is closely 
related to the non-observed economy. We show that the size of this part of the hidden 
economy is determined by the tax rate related to the consumption and the level of 
corruption. We also demonstrate that the concealed consumption share plays an 
important role in the determination of the size of various segments of the labor market, 
while the developments of these segments also have their impact on this specific 
indicator of the hidden economy.    
 
 
2   TAX RATES AND CORRUPTION EXPLAINING THE SIZE OF THE 
HIDDEN ECONOMY 
 
The above mentioned limited exact knowledge about the size of the hidden economy in 
different countries has induced researchers to investigate, both theoretically and 
empirically, the relationships between some possible explanatory factors (tax rates, 
corruption, other institutional factors) of the evolution of the hidden economy and the 
development of different segments of the visible labour market.  
 
In the respective literature the most universally accepted inquiry is the investigation 
of the role of the tax rates in the explanation of the cross-country differences in the 
employment rate and the unemployment rate: see Layard et al., 1991; Scarpetta, 1996; 
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998;Leibfritz et al., 1997; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000; Jackmann, 2002; Daveri and Tabellini, 1997; Planas et al., 2003; Belot 
and Van Ours, 2001, Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2002, Nickell, 2003. Taxes on labor 
influence both workers’ decisions about how much labor they supply and firms’ decisions 
about how much labor they employ. Higher personal income taxes and employee social 
security contributions tend to reduce the return to working, which may discourage labor 
supply and depress potential output. Not only employment, but also wages may respond 
to the variation in labor taxes. The size and pattern of this response, however, depend on 
the institutional structure of wage bargaining, labor market policies and the degree of 
competition in the product markets. In the presence of rigidities on both labor and 
product markets, workers’ resistance to taxes on their labor efforts can boost wage 
demands, thereby raising the labor costs for employers. At the same time, an increase in  
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employer payroll taxes will raise labor costs directly, i.e. employers will not be able to 
offset them by lowering wages. Such shifting of taxes onto labor costs, in turn, decreases 
the demand for labor, as it decreases profitability and investment. 
 
In the investigations of the development of different visible segments of the labour 
market, i.e. employment, self-employment and unemployment, the direct effect of 
corruption has usually been neglected. The impact of corruption has been seriously taken 
into account only in the investigation of the hidden (unofficial) economy. Theoretically 
the relationship between corruption and the hidden economy may be either 
complementary
2 or substitutive
3. The empirical evidence so far has been mostly in favour 
of complementarities. A recent paper by Dreher and Schneider (2006), however, offers a 
more subtle relationship: it shows that in high income countries corruption and the 
hidden economy are substitutes, while in low income countries they are complements.  
 
Loayza (1997) investigates the emergence of the hidden (informal) economy 
assuming that excessive taxes and regulations on the on hand, and a government unable 
to enforce these, on the other, are together important explanatory factors for hidden 
activities. His proxies for weak tax enforcement are the quality of bureaucracy and 
corruption. Using data for Latin American countries in the early 1990s he tests some of 
the implications of the model, and estimates the size of the informal sector in these 
countries. He uses a MIMIC (Multiple-Indicator, Multiple-Cause) model of latent 
variable, where exogenous causes determine the latent variable, and the latent variable 
determines a set of endogenous indicator variables. The causal variables are the 
corporate income tax rate, a proxy for labour market restrictions, and a proxy for the 
strength of the enforcement system. The results of the calculations show that the size of 
the informal sector depends positively on proxies used for the tax burden and for labour 
market restrictions, and negatively on a proxy for the quality of government institutions. 
 
Johnson et al. (1997), using a sample of the transition countries, examine how the 
interplay between politics and economic and institutional incentives influences the 
growth of the unofficial economy and, in turn, how the unofficial economy affects 
economic performance. The authors set up a simple model of tax and regulatory 
                                                        
2 See Choi and Thum (2004) and Rose-Ackermann (1997). 
3 See Friedmann et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (1998).  
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incentives that lead firms to choose between operating in the official or in the unofficial 
sector. A higher unofficial economy leads to a loss in public revenues, less public goods, 
such as law and order, a decrease in the productivity of firms, as well as to a further 
boost to the unofficial economy. Firms in the unofficial sector neither pay official taxes 
nor share in public goods. Instead, they pay private agencies – the ‘mafia’ – for contract 
enforcement and protection from thieves. A multiple equilibrium model ensues.  
 
The empirical analysis in Johnson et al. (1997), based on data from a wide variety of 
sources, offers support to the model. As the output of the unofficial sector is not recorded 
in the official GDP, the authors use the estimation method of total GDP from total 
national electricity consumption.
4 The results suggest substantial variation in the size of 
the unofficial sector across the transition economies, as well as significant differences in 
both the levels and growth rates of total GDP compared to the official GDP.  
 
To quantify the relative costs and benefits for businesses of their choice in operating 
in the official economy Johnson et al. (1997) use an array of indicators including 
measures of liberalization, privatization, deregulation, corruption, and tax fairness, as 
well as characteristics of the legal environment. The latter are the public goods most 
relevant to the theoretical model developed by the authors. Better performance in terms 
of these institutional and legal environment measures is associated with a smaller 
unofficial economy and higher official GDP. In turn, a large unofficial sector and less 
official output are associated with larger budgetary deficits and higher inflation. 
 
Friedman et al. (2000) raise the question: what drives entrepreneurs and large 
businesses underground? They bring up two competing hypotheses: (1) high taxes, (2) 
special political and social institutions that govern the economy, such as excessive 
bureaucracy and corruption, and a weak legal environment. When testing the two 
hypotheses the authors use data from 69 countries for the 1990s for variables such as tax 
rates, bureaucratic hindrances, corruption, the legal environment, and the size of the 
unofficial economy. The analysis reveals no evidence that higher direct or indirect tax 
rates are associated with a larger unofficial economy. In fact, the authors find some 
support to the relationship that higher direct tax rates are associated with a smaller 
                                                        
4 This method was developed by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996).  
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underground sector. However, when per capita income levels are controlled for (in order 
to allow for the possibility that richer countries have a better-run administration, and 
operate with higher tax rates), this paradoxical relationship ceases to be significant. By 
contrast, Friedman et al. find that more bureaucracy, greater corruption and weaker 
legal environment are all associated with a larger unofficial economy, even (in most 
cases) when per capita income is controlled for. These findings are confirmed not only 
for the whole sample, but also for different groups of countries, such as the OECD 
countries, the transition economies, and Latin American states.  
 
Johnson et al. (1999) also investigate the relationship between taxes and the 
unofficial economy. After building a theoretical model, they empirically show that the tax 
burden on the agents depends much more on the extent of bribery and corruption, than 
on the tax rates per se.  
 
Lackó (2006) used three types of explanatory variables, tax rates, the extent of 
corruption and various institutional aspects of the labour market, for the explanation of 
the relative size of the visible segments of the labour market in developed market 
economies and in some transition countries. The novelty of that analysis was that it 
asserted that the role of corruption was closely connected with tax rates, and the two 
effects were combined in an indicator of their interaction term.    
 
There are numerous definitions for the concept of corruption. The simplest definition 
is that it is the abuse of public power for private gains. While accepting this general 
definition we should not exclude the possibility that corruption-like behaviour exists in 
exclusively private sector activities as well. In large private enterprises, particularly when 
the managers are not the same as the owners, this phenomenon can also exist, but here 
the usual conflict between public and private interest transforms to the conflict between 
company and personal private interest. 
 
The two forms of corruption (small and grand) Lackó (2006) can be considered as 
extra taxes. More pervasive small corruption means that the nominal, statutory tax rate 
will be complemented with an additional cost or tax related to this corruption. In the 
case of grand corruption (occurring on the higher levels of the political hierarchy) this  
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connection is more indirect: a strong grand corruption signals that in the given country 
public revenues are less likely to be used for the necessary public services, and also that 
the risk of conducting orderly business is high. Under extensive grand corruption the 
main functions of the public sector are distorted: the allocative function (allocation 
between social and private goods), the redistributive function (redistribution between 
the rich and poor), as well as the stabilization function (the use of the budget policy to 
maintain a sufficient level of employment, the stability of prices, budget deficit, and so 
on).  
 
As Lackó (2006) emphasizes, members of the society are not blind, sooner or later 
they perceive the extra-tax nature of corruption and respond in their own way. In the 
literature about tax compliance we find propositions, based both on theory and on 
results from controlled experiments, about people’s reaction to corruption. Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976) and Smith (1992) hypothesize that a taxpayer will feel ‘cheated’ if he 
believes that his tax dollars are not well spent, and may respond by refusing to pay his 
full tax liability. Alm et al. (1992) perform experiments to test this idea. They find a 
greater willingness to comply with tax obligations when participants perceive that they 
will receive benefits in public goods funded by the taxes collected. Using experimental 
methods Webley et al. (1991) also examine what role taxpayers’ satisfaction with the 
operation of the government plays in the compliance to pay taxes. The authors find that 
those participants, whose responses to a survey taken several months before the 
experiments indicated alienation from government or a negative attitude towards laws, 
are significantly more likely to engage in tax evasion during the experiments. In their 
theoretical model Pommerehne et al. (1994) find that the greater the deviation between 
the individuals’ optimal choice of public goods provision and the actual level, the more 
they, as taxpayers, underpay their taxes; the higher the level of squander by the 
government in the previous period, the less the individual is willing to contribute in the 
present. In their survey investigation for the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and 
Poland, Hanousek and Palda (2002) show that those, who believed that they were 
getting quality government services also tended to evade taxes much less than those, who 
did not believe getting the services they expected. The authors find that governments are 
constrained in their actual tax collection by the perceptions people have about the quality 
of government services that they receive.  
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Lackó (2006) stated: a simple comparison of statutory tax rates across countries to 
analyze the tax burden may be misleading, since in this case one does not take into 
account  the environment in which tax rates let their impact be felt. In this context 
“environment” means the way taxes are set and collected (coherence, transparency and 
the orderliness of the tax system and tax collection), as well as the way taxes are used in 
the provision of government services (again transparent, orderly and economical 
utilization). For a proper cross-country comparison of the tax burden one has to take 
into account not only the traditional tax rates, but the level of corruption, too. We 
illustrate these two kinds of burden on Figure 3.   
                                                        [Figure 3] 
Data points in the figure show how the traditional tax wedge and the burden due to 
corruption press the employers and employees in the OECD countries in 2004
5. Here, 
and in the further investigations, the tax wedge is defined as follows: the sum of 
employees’ and employers’ social contributions, plus personal income tax, less transfer 
payments, all as a percentage of gross labour costs, paid by a one-earner married couple 
at the so called APW (average production worker) level.
 6  
 
On Figure 3 we can see that Sweden has the highest traditional tax wedge, but with 
respect to the level of corruption, it is positioned at a much lower (better) level than the 
average of the OECD countries. Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have also 
higher traditional tax wedges than the average, and levels of corruption below the OECD 
average. From among the Central and East European transition economies in the sample 
Poland and Hungary have both higher than average traditional tax wedges and higher 
than average levels of corruption, while in Czech Republic the higher level of corruption 
goes together with an average size of tax wedge. Similarly to the Hungarian and Polish 
cases, some more developed market economies (such as Italy, Greece and Turkey) have 
relatively high tax wedges and high levels of corruption.   
                                                                                                  
                                                        
5 The burden or level of corruption k, may be derived from the corruption index in two ways. We can apply 
k  = (10/corruption index) or k  = (10 – corruption index), since the corruption index calculated by 
Transparency International gives values practically between 1 and 10, where the value of 10 represents 
the corruption-free environment. In Figure 3, as well as in the relevant regression calculations the second 
form of k is used .   
 
6   This corresponds to the use of the concept of tax wedge in OECD analyses and statistics.  
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We can show – for taxes related to different tax bases – that tax rates, when 
combined with corruption, do exert a strong influence on the size of the hidden 
economy. We use two country samples: for each different tax indicators are available. 
For both sample we use data for the size of the hidden economy taken from already 
available estimations. Sample I covers 31 countries, including 18 developed, 8 developing 
and 5 transition countries. Here the tax indicators used are the income tax rate and the 
corporate tax rate. We estimate a regression equation explaining the share of the hidden 
economy in a slightly different way as Friedmann at al. (2000) did: we exclude two 
“outlier countries” (Poland and Slovakia), and we analyze the impact of the main 
explanatory variables (tax rates and corruption) both separately and jointly. (Friedmann 
at al. investigated the effects of these explanatory variables only separately.) The results 
are presented in Table 2.  
[Table 2] 
We find, similarly as Friedman et al. (2000), that the income tax rate has no 
significant relationship with the size of the hidden economy (see column [1] in Table 2). 
If we add the corruption index to the explanation (column [2]), the size of the hidden 
economy is significantly influenced by the extent of corruption, but the impact of the 
income tax rate and the corporate tax rate are significant only at the 90% level.  In 
column [3] we show the results from a specification including the interaction of tax rates 
and the level of corruption in the explanation of the share of the hidden economy. The 
results show that this interaction term is significant. With the usual interpretation we 
can assert that the impact of the changes in the tax rates on the size of the hidden 
economy depends on the level of corruption.     
 
Sample II contains 21 OECD countries, and here we make calculations with the tax 
wedge. The results of the calculations are shown in the second block of Table 2. As it 
turns out, in this sample the tax wedge and the corruption index explain the size of the 
hidden economy both separately and jointly. Here we also experience that the interaction 
term of the tax rate and the level of corruption is significant: the effect of the tax wedge 
on the hidden economy depends on the level of corruption.   
 
The calculations on the two samples of countries above give a preliminary indication 
that the tax rates and corruption are relevant explanatory variables in the context of the 
hidden economy. However, the results have to be taken with caution in view of a certain  
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problem with the data used here but having been generated by previous estimations 
procedures. In the calculations outlined above the values for the size of the hidden 
economy (the left hand side variable) were taken from sources which, given the nature of 
the hidden economy, produced these values based on certain estimation procedures. 
These procedures, in turn, usually already assume the impact of different tax rates on the 
hidden economy. For this reason, when we use the estimated values of the size of the 
hidden economy, with the aim of investigating the impact of tax rates, we can easily 
arrive at a tautological relationship.  
 
Partly for the above reason, we carry out further investigations to show to what 
extent tax rates and corruption are relevant explanatory variables in an important visible 
segment of the labour market. We focus on the determination of participation of the 
active population as self-employed.  The investigation of the self-employment rate is 
important because it is better recorded than hidden employment, but the behaviour of 
the self-employed segment of the labour market shows much similarity with the hidden 
employment. In the literature, especially in analyses dealing with developing countries, 
the self-employed are usually defined as part of the informal economy. 
 
3 TAX RATES AND CORRUPTION EXPLAINING THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
RATES 
The sector of self-employed is, as a rule, a poorly recorded and somewhat mysterious 
part of the national economies. As a consequence, the determination of the size of self-
employment is far from straightforward. 
 
In most countries the agricultural sector uses a relatively high proportion of self-
employed workers; therefore, in a cross-country perspective a higher share of 
agricultural employment is usually associated with a higher share of self-employment in 
total employment. During the 1990s, however, in most OECD countries non-agricultural 
s e l f - e m p l o y m e n t  g r e w  f a s t e r  t h a n  c i v i l i a n  e m p l o y m e n t  a s  a  w h o l e ,  w i t h  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
increasing the share of non-agricultural self-employed. Various, to some extent 
overlapping, explanations have been put forward for this recent renaissance in self-
employment (c. f. OECD, 2000a):   
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It may have been a reaction to the overly rigid labour and product markets and to the 
high level of taxation. The opportunities that self-employment offers in paying less tax to 
the state could have been partly responsible for the recent reallocation of employment to 
this sector.  
The growth of the self-employed sector reflected changes in the industrial 
organization. Greater stress on outsourcing non-core activities may have increased the 
amount of work subcontracted to the self-employed, due to the experience that self-
employment business has shown greater flexibility and speed of response than 
traditional firms. 
 
Cross-country studies traditionally emphasize that there is a strong negative 
correlation between the level of GDP per capita and the share of non-agricultural self-
employment without unpaid family workers (Kuznets, 1966, Schultz, 1990, Bregger, 
1996). This empirical finding is usually substantiated with the argument that a low level 
of prosperity coincides with a low level of wages, implying little pressure to increase 
efficiency, or to increase the average scale of enterprise activities. At this stage of 
development a major route for ambitious wage earners to increase their incomes is to set 
up an own shop and become an entrepreneur. Economic development subsequently 
leads to rising wages, which stimulates enterprises to work more efficiently and to reap 
economies of scale and scope. An additional effect of rising wage levels is the increased 
attraction of wage-employment: the high and secure income of wage-earners increase 
the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed (cf. Iygun and Owen, 1998).  
 
Empirical investigations, including cross-sectional econometric investigations 
usually try to find out which of these two tendencies – traditional, income-related or/and 
the more recent, organization- and regulations-related trends – is dominant in the 
determination of the size of the self-employed sector. The usual explanatory factors used 
are the level of development, the unemployment rate, the proportion of women in the 
labour force, the share of GDP produced in the service sector, as well as average and 




In these models the sign of the coefficient of the unemployment rate is a priori 
uncertain, since with the growth of the self-employment rate the unemployment rate 
may either increase or decrease depending on the segments of the labour market from 
which people move to the self-employment sector. Estimates on the effect of growing 
unemployment on self-employment vary from study to study. Investigations at the 
micro-level, however, show that most self-employed people were previously in wage and 
salary employment, and a substantial proportion of self-employed leave their self 
employed status for entering or re-entering the segment of wage- and salary-
employment. Only a very small proportion of the unemployed people find employment 
through self-employment. 
 
As for the other variables in the regressional equations explaining self-employment, 
the proportion of women in the labour force is usually expected to have a negative 
coefficient, while the share of the service sector in GDP a positive one. While these are 
plausible assumptions, not all the relevant econometric estimations could confirm them.  
 
With respect to the role of the average tax rate, most of the investigations arrived at 
the result that the tax rate has a positive coefficient: an environment characterized by 
higher average tax rates provides more incentive to find ways of avoiding and evading 
taxes through self-employment, and people tend to utilize these opportunities. This was 
found, for instance, by Robson and Wren (1999), OECD (2000a) and Scharle (2002). 
However, one can find a few such investigations as well which could not confirm this 
assumption.  
  
Following this brief survey we turn to our own investigation of the determinants of 
the self-employment rate in 28 OECD countries in 1995-2004. In Table 3 the results of 
the estimation are presented. The explanatory variables are the tax wedge, the 
corruption index, and the share of agricultural employment in the given country. The 
method is the random-effects GLS regression.  
[Table 3] 
The results in Table 3 indicate that in all the regression calculations the agricultural 
employment rate has a very strong positive effect. After the brief review of literature of 
self- employment above this comes as no surprise. In the calculation where the impact of  
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corruption as an extra tax is not taken into account (column [1] ) we find that the tax 
wedge has a positive but insignificant parameter, which means that higher traditional tax 
rates alone do not induce, ceteris paribus, higher rates of self-employment. In the 
regression calculation incorporating corruption (column [2] in Table 3) we find that, 
while the coefficient for the tax wedge is insignificant, the coefficient of corruption shows 
a significantly positive sign: higher corruption increases the share of self-employed. If, 
along with the tax wedge, we use the interaction term of the tax wedge and the level of 
corruption (columns [3]), the coefficient of this term turns out significantly positive, 
while the coefficient of tax wedge is negative, but insignificant. This means that a higher 
tax wedge with higher corruption increases the share of self-employment rate in total 
employment.  
 
The likely explanation for this relationship is twofold. First, for the self-employed 
himself/herself, the self-employment status offers ample opportunity to evade taxes, and 
higher taxes with higher corruption give more encouragement to choose a status where 
one can evade them. Second, higher taxes with higher corruption offer more 
opportunities for tax-avoidance not only for the self-employed, but also for the 
enterprises that used to employ workers in a traditional way. By pushing some of their 
traditionally used employees to the self-employed sector and by keeping them working 
for the enterprise, they can use this outsourcing setup to avoid paying social security 
contributions and providing other in-kind benefits and protection to them. 
   
When comparing the reaction of male and female self-employed to the tax wedge, we 
can see that a higher tax wedge alone increases the attractivity  to become self-employed  
for the male workers, but  it decreases it for the female ones (see columns [2] and [3] in 
Table 4 and 5). The effects of the level of corruption and the interaction term (tax wedge 
* corruption) are, however, similar for both genders.     
                                                       [Table 4] 
                                                       [Table 5] 
Assuming that the environment is similar by corrupt the effect of a similar change in 
the tax wedge on the self-employment rate is different for the two genders: a higher tax 
wedge encourages men, while discourages women choosing the self-employed status.  
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Nevertheless, all in all, in the investigation of the behaviour of becoming self-
employed we can experience the same pattern as we have seen in becoming part of the 
hidden economy: the interaction term of the tax wedge and corruption is an important 
explanatory variable explaining the size of both segments of the labour market, both 
time-wise within a single country, and across the investigated countries in a single year.  
 
As mentioned above, in the investigations of the hidden economy, we considered 
some of our results with reservations, because the left-hand variable, the value of the 
indicator of the size of the hidden economy was taken from indirect estimations based 
partly on the size of tax rates and corruption; therefore the results, such as those in Table 
2, had the possibility of containing tautological relationships.  
 
In order to get rid of the suspicion of tautological reasoning now we return to 
investigation of the size of the hidden economy, but with the help a special indicator, the 
concealed consumption share in per cent of total consumption of taxable goods and 
services.     
 
 
4 THE CONCEALED CONSUMPTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
The concealed consumption share in percent of total consumption of taxable goods and 
services (CCS) calculated by Holzner and Christie (2006) can be seen as a kind of 
measure of the hidden economy. This measure is free from the problems that we could 
experience in various indirect estimations of the size of the hidden economy. Christie 
and Holzner (2006), using national account aggregates as their starting point, 
constructed estimates of the relevant tax bases for VAT and excise taxes. Next, they 
computed estimates of compliance rates for these taxes for each available year, based on 
tax revenue data as well as taxation laws and regulations. The indicator they arrived at is 
the Concealed Consumption Share which they base on the non-compliance part of the 
relevant taxes. Table 6 presents their results, the Concealed Consumption Share (CCS) in 
per cent of total consumption of taxable goods and services, and Concealed Consumption  
  20
in per cent of GDP. (For details of the method of the calculation see Christie and Holzner 
(2006).)  
[Table 6] 
The kind of hidden economy measured by the indicator of concealed consumption is 
connected to various taxes, but mainly to the value added tax (VAT). From the whole 
hidden economy this is only one part, but this part is rather broad: potentially all the 
consumers may participate in it, as well as those producers (especially in the service 
sector) who sell at the end of the vertical phases of production and whose contribution to 
the total value added of the product or service that they sell is particularly large.  The 
most distinctive characteristic of the evasion of VAT is that it emerges from the collusion 
between sellers and buyers who traditionally have contradictory interests, but here they 
act in collusion against the state. For this reason the concealed consumption share is a 
particularly important indicator of the general tax morale of the society; therefore, the 
size of this indicator has implications for all kinds of hidden activities.  
 
In this section we investigate the behaviour of this hidden-economy indicator, 
namely its relationship with the VAT rate combined with corruption and with various 
segments of the labour market.  
 
As illustrated on Figures 4 and 5 the CCS has only a weak positive relationship with 
the traditional VAT rate, while it shows a stronger positive relationship with the 
interaction of VAT rate and corruption. These results confirm our previous experience 
that a tax rate influences the size of the hidden economy not by itself, but together with 
the level of corruption.  
 
The size of the hidden economy represented by the CCS may hinge not only on the 
VAT rate, but on the differences in the employment statuses in terms of allowing more or 
less tax evasion. This is why it is important to investigate (in a cross-country 
comparison) how this kind of indicator of the hidden economy is connected with the 
different visible segments of the labour market. Table 7 shows cross-country correlations 
between the CCS and the employment rate, unemployment rate and self-employment 
rate in 26 European countries in the years 2000-2003. Greece, Croatia, Slovenia and 
Cyprus were left out from the sample on purpose. Christie and Holzner got rather low  
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values of CCS for these countries, which these authors attributed to the importance of 
tourism revenues heavily underestimated by national statistical agencies.  
                                                         [Table 7] 
From Table 7 we can see a clear negative relationship between the CCS and the 
employment rate. This relationship is not very strong, though, probably because a 
segment of the employed people, the self-employed, behaves differently than the rest. 
This can be seen from the positive correlation between the CCS and the self-employment 
rate: the share of concealed consumption seems larger in those countries, where the 
share of self-employed is larger. The unemployed people behave similarly to the self-
employed: in a cross-country comparison larger CCS is associated with larger 
unemployment rate. From these telling correlation coefficients, however, we do not 
know the causal directions of the relationships: one may assume that higher CCS is 
explained by higher self-employment rate, because this employment status is conductive 
to tax evasion; but one may similarly assume that higher self-employment rate is 
explained by higher CCS, because the larger opportunity for tax evasion pushes people to 
choose the self-employed status. From the next small recursive equation system we are 
able to show that both types of explanation are relevant.  
 
Equation (1) explains the concealed consumption share: 
(1)  CCSit = f (VATit-1*(10/ kit-1) , SELFit-1 , Uit-1, AGRit-1) 
                                      +                    +               +          -   
 Equation (2) explains the self-employment rate:  
(2)  SELFit= f(CCSit, SELFit-1) 
                                      +           +         
Equation (3) explains the rate of non-employment (i.e. the sum of unemployed and 
economically inactive people): 
(3)  NONEMPit= f( CCSit, AGRit-1, Uit-1, SELFit-1) 
                                         +          +          +        - 
 
where  
             CCSit: the concealed consumption share in percent of total consumption of 
taxable goods and services; 
            SELFit: the share of self-employed people in total employment;    
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             VATit* (10/kit) :  interaction of the VAT rate and corruption; 
              Uit:  unemployment rate; 
              AGRit : the share of people employed in the agrarian sector in total 
employment; 
             NONEMPit : the share of non-employed people in the working age population; 
              i: country index; 
              t: years: 2000,  2001, 2002, 2003;  
              +/-: positive/negative direction of the relationship between the explanatory 
variable and the explained variable; 
In this system we take CCS, SELF, and NONEMP as endogenous, while the other 
variables are exogenous. Equation (1) describes that higher interaction term of VAT rate 
and level of corruption in year t-1 is associated with a higher concealed consumption 
share in year t. With the same interaction term of VAT rate and corruption, however, the 
concealed consumption share in year t is higher in a country if the share of self-employed 
people in the total employment is higher and the unemployment rate is also higher, both 
in year t-1. In equation (1) we take into account the share of agrarian-employment, 
because it is especially the agrarian self-employed who tend to produce goods not for the 
market, but for their own consumption. GDP contains this own consumption as a part of 
the inputted non-observed economy, but this activity does not bring about tax revenues. 
This is the reason why in the explanation of concealed consumption share we control for 
this factor with a negative sign. Equation (2) explains the rate of self-employment with 
its earlier value and with the concealed consumption share in year t: a higher concealed 
consumption share is associated with a higher rate of self-employment. Equation (3) 
explains the share of non-employed people in the working age population. The size of 
this segment of the labour market depends, in a natural way, on the lagged 
unemployment rate, on the lagged agrarian employment rate and the lagged self-
employment rate. There are certainly non-employed people who in fact work, but do not 
pay taxes. For this reason it is plausible to make the assumption that a higher concealed 
consumption share is associated with a higher share of the non-employed people. There 
is a chance that we will experience multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, 
because, according equation (1), CCSit has some relationship with Uit-1, SELFit-1and AGRit-
1. We may assume, however, that Uit-1, SELFit-1and AGRit-1 has their effects felt on the 
share of non-employed people not only trough CCSit, but also independently of it and  
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directly:  for instance, a higher unemployment rate is associated with a higher non-
employed share, because the former segment is a part of the latter. 
 
The parameters of this small simple model are estimated with the two-stage LS 
method, where the instruments of all equations are the same, namely the exogenous 
variables of the model. (One may notice that in case of equation (1) the two-stage LS 
method produces the same results as the OLS method, because in that equation all the 
explanatory variables are exogenous variables.)  
 
Table 8 shows the estimation results for equation (1). These results are quite 
interesting. First of all, the explanatory variables explain well the cross country 
differences of the share of concealed consumption, the R2 is 0.72, and the signs of the 
parameters are as expected. This means that the lagged interaction term of the VAT rate 
and corruption, the self-employment rate and the unemployment rate influence the 
concealed consumption share with a positive sign, while the agrarian employment rate 
has a negative sign in this determination.   
                                                                 [Table 8] 
Second, in this estimation we experience the same characteristic features as found in 
the 1 part of this paper: the VAT rate, together with the index of corruption as an extra 
tax, is a relevant variable: namely it has a significant effect on the size of the hidden 
economy (here represented by CCS).  
 
Table 9 contains the results of the estimations for equation (2). The rate of self-
employment in year t depends not only on its lagged value, but on the concealed 
consumption share experienced in year t, too. A higher share of concealed consumption 
induces a higher rate of self-employment, since high CCS makes this employment status 
more attractive. In the estimated equation (2c) we show that the factors (the lagged 
interaction of the VAT rate and corruption, the agrarian employment rate and the self-
employment rate) that influence the CCS play also a significant role in the explanation of 
the self-employment rate in year t. In this estimation the lagged unemployment rate 
turned out insignificant, possibly because its positive effect on CCS and through it on 
self-employment, on the one hand, and its possible direct negative effect on the self-
employment rate (experienced in Lackó,2004) on the other, neutralized each other.  
                                                       [Table 9]  
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Table 10 contains the results of estimations for equation (3). Equation (3a) shows 
that in addition to the positive effect of the lagged unemployment rate and the lagged 
agrarian-employment rate, also the concealed consumption share in year t influences the 
share of non-employed people in the working age population in year t. This equation has 
a higher R2 than the one without the effect of CCS (see function (3b) in Table 10). 
                                                         [Table 10]  
Similar relationships were experienced in the explanation of the share of the male 
non-employed in equations (3c) and (3d), but here the explanatory power turned out 
much stronger than in the total population of non-employed. This stronger relationship 
is understandable because female non-employment is as a rule, impacted by additional 
important social factors that we did not take into account in the calculations. In 
estimations (3e) and (3f) we explain the share of non-employed male population by the 
factors that influence the concealed consumption share, such as the VAT rate, the 
corruption index (or the joint indicator of these) and the lagged size of  the other 
segments of the labour market (unemployment rate, self-employment rate and agrarian-
employment rate). In these equations the lagged self-employment rate and the lagged 
agrarian employment rate have insignificant parameters, because in both cases the effect 
of the respective variables on the non-employment rate has two directions; a positive 
(negative) indirectly through CCS, and a negative (positive) through their direct effects, 
respectively. These opposite effects on the sign of the parameters neutralize each other in 
the explanation of the share of non-employed male.  
 
Summarizing the empirical test of the simultaneous system we can show on a simple 
scheme (see Figure 6) how the cross-country differences of the various segments of the 
labour market and the concealed consumption shares (hidden economy) define a system 
of behavioural relationships in the countries concerned. 
                                                         [Figure 6] 
 
 
5 SUMMARY  
 
The working of hidden, shadow or non-observed economies is reflected in the respective 
labour markets; these invisible parts of the national economy do not leave the various 
segments of the labour market untouched. The relationship between the hidden  
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economy and the various segments of the labour market is very complex. The hidden 
economy is mostly associated with hidden employment, but this hidden employment can 
be found not only among the officially inactive and unemployed people, but among the 
self-employed people and the employees as well. While we experience these features in 
our own everyday life, an exact, rigorous investigation of this relationship is very difficult 
to carry out.  
 
The macro investigation of the relationship between the size of the hidden economy 
and the size of the different segments of the labour market is difficult, because due to its 
invisible feature and heterogeneity a good and comprehensive definition and reliable 
methods of measurement of the hidden economy are missing.  In the literature we find 
various macro-estimations for the size of the hidden economy in many countries, but 
these results are rather unreliable, and many of them contradict to each other. This lack 
of reliable indicators of the hidden economy is the reason that so far very few empirical 
investigations have been carried out about the relationships between the hidden 
economy and the various segments of the visible labour market.  
 
In section 2 the effects of tax rates and corruption on the size of the hidden economy 
were analyzed based on different indirect estimations of the hidden economy. Section 3 
investigated the international evolution of self-employment rates with partly similar 
explanatory factors as it was done for the hidden economy in section 2. Section 4 set up 
and quantified a model to analyze the interrelationships among the hidden economy, the 
pool of self-employed and non-employed people. In this section we used a specific 
indicator of the hidden economy, the concealed consumption share which was closely 
related to the non-observed economy. We showed that the size of this part of the hidden 
economy was determined by the tax rate related to the consumption and the level of 
corruption. We also demonstrated that the concealed consumption share played an 
important role in the determination of the size of various segments of the labor market, 
while the developments of these segments also had their impact on this specific indicator 
of the hidden economy.     
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             The share of non-observed economy in GDP, % 
Country  Share of non-observed economy  Year of estimation 
in GDP, % 
Bulgaria  16  2000 
Czech Republic  9  1998 
Hungary  16  1997 
Latvia  17  1998 
Lithuania  18  1998 
Poland  13  1998 
Slovakia  22  1998 
Kazakstan  27  2000 
Kirgistan  48  1999 
Russia  25  2000 
Belgium   3-4  1997 
Canada  3  1992 
Ireland  4  1998 
Italy  15  1998 
USA  1.2  1992 
Source: Non-observed Economy in National Accounts, 2002, UNECE 
















Regression equations explaining the size of the hidden economy 
Dependent variable: Share of the hidden economy in the GDP, per cent 
Sample I  Sample II 
Independent var.  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
ln GDP  -17.5  -13.4  -13.6  -11.28  -7.63  -8.15 
[-10.7]  [-4.92]  [-6.18]  [-6.04]  [-2.87]  [-3.86] 
INCOMETAX  0.13  0.14 
[1.49]  [1.74] 
CORPTAX  0.24  0.17 
[2.55]  [1.92] 
TAXWEDGE  0.3  0.26 
[3.26]  [3.60] 
CORRUPTION  -1.37  -0.94 
[-2.71]  [-2.18] 
INCOMETAX* CORRUPTION  0.026 
[2.14] 
CORPTAX*CORRUPTION  0.026 
[1.90] 
TAXWEDGE*CORRUPTION  0.03 
[2.98] 
R2  0.85  0.87  0.87  0.69  0.73  0.74 
RMSE  5.39  5.13  4.98  3.64  3.5  3.41 
n  31  31  31  21  21  21 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Sample I source of data on hidden economy: Friedman et al (2000), 31 countries,     1995 
Sample II source of data on hidden economy: Schneider (2004), 21 OECD countries,   1998 
OLS: Ordinary Least Square Method with Huber-White standard errors, CORRUPTION=10-corruption index 
Under the coefficients the t-statistics are in parentheses  




Regression explaining the self-employment rate 
 
 










Explanatory variables  [1]  [2]  [3] 
AGR  0.95  0.95  0.97 
[18.5]  [20.8]  [20.6] 
TAXWEDGE*  0.012  0.034  -0.038 
[0.5]  [1.59]  [-1.66] 
CORRUPTION**  0.9 
[7.81] 
TAXWEDGE*CORRUPTION  0.021 
[6.85] 
CONSTANT  10.3  6.94  9.66 
[7.9]  [5.32]  [7.77] 
R2 within  0.6  0.69  0.67 
R2 between  0.8  0.82  0.82 
R2 overall  0.81  0.84  0.84 
Number of observations  220  216  216 
* Average of singles and married one earner families 
** CORRUPTION = (10-corruption index) 

















Explanatory variables  [1]  [2]  [3] 
AGR  0.8  0.81  0.82 
[13.7]  [15.5]  [15.4] 
TAXWEDGE*  0.046  0.074  -0.004 
[1.71]  [3.01]  [-0.16] 
CORRUPTION**  0.95 
[7.14] 
TAXWEDGE*CORRUPTION  0.023 
[6.5] 
CONSTANT  12.7  8.93  11.8 
[8.6]  [5.92]  [8.2] 
R2 within  0.48  0.59  0.57 
R2 between  0.71  0.72  0.72 
R2 overall  0.71  0.74  0.75 
Number of observations  209  207  207 
* Average of singles and married one earner families 
** CORRUPTION=(10-corruption index) 




Regressions explaining the female self-employment rate  
 
 










Explanatory variables  [1]  [2]  [3] 
AGR  1.17  1.18  1.2 
[21.1]  [23.6]  [23.0] 
TAXWEDGE*  -0.079  -0.064  -0.137 
[-3.1]  [-2.71]  [-5.36] 
CORRUPTION**  0.93 
[7.36] 
TAXWEDGE*CORRUPTION  0.021 
[6.2] 
CONSTANT  9.26  5.98  8.88 
[6.4]  [4.1]  [6.37] 
R2 within  0.66  0.73  0.71 
R2 between  0.85  0.86  0.86 
R2 overall  0.85  0.87  0.87 
Number of observations  209  207  207 
* Average of singles and married one earner families 
** CORRUPTION= (10-corruption index) 




Concealed consumption as a share of total consumption (CCS) and total 
GDP (CCGDP), Average 2000-2003,%  , 
CCS  CC 
Croatia  14.2  11.1 
Cyprus  21.2  19.4 
Slovenia  24.1  17 
Denmark  26.1  14.5 
Greece  27.5  21.5 
Germany  27.5  17.9 
Netherlands  27.7  17.6 
Finland  30.1  17.9 
Luxembourg  30.2  18.1 
Sweden  33.7  21 
Austria  35.3  24.1 
Estonia  36.3  28.6 
Portugal  38.7  30.7 
France  38.8  25.3 
Malta  38.9  33.5 
Spain  38.9  27.9 
Belgium  39  24.9 
United Kingdom  39.8  34 
Bulgaria  42.7  34.1 
Turkey  43.5  34.5 
Lithuania  44.5  35.4 
Ireland  44.8  29.8 
Hungary  45.7  31.4 
Slovakia  47.4  34.9 
Latvia  47.4  36.1 
Romania  47.4  34.5 
Poland  53.7  42.1 
Italy  54  38.5 
Czech Republic  54.4  39.9 
EU-29 average  37.7  27.5 
Source: Christie and Holzner (2006) 




















Employment rate  Unemployment rate  Self-employment rate 
Concealed consumption share  -0.59  0.49  0.52 
Number of observations  104  102  86 
Table 7 
Correlations between the share of concealed consumption in total 
consumption and the size of the different segments of the labor market 






Sample: 26 European countries in 2000-2003 
Dependent variable:CCS  it 
(1a)  (1b) 
Explanatory variable 
ln VAT  it-1  0.17 
[3.65] 
ln k  it-1  -0.16 
[-6.2] 
ln (VAT  it-1 *(10/ k)  it-1  )  0.16 
[7.66] 
ln SELF  i t-1  0.082  0.082 
[4.78]  [5.25] 
ln AGR i t-1  -0.054  -0.053 
[-4.31]  [-4.34] 
ln U  it-1  0.036  0.033 
[2.56]  [2.41] 
dummy for t  yes  yes 
constant  yes  yes 
R 
2  0.72  0.72 
RMSE  0.049  0.049 
Number of observations  64  64 
Method  2LS  2LS 
Equation (1) 
Table 8 











Regressions explaining the self-employment rate 
Equation (2) 
Dependent variable :  ln SELF  it 
Explanatory variable  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 
ln VAT  it-1 
ln k  it-1 
ln (VAT  it-1 *(10/ k  it-1  ))  0.05 
[1.99] 
ln SELF  i t-1  0.94  0.94  0.978 
[28.5]  [28.6]  [28.8] 
ln AGR i t-1  -0.029 
[-2.23] 
ln U  it-1 
CCS  it  0.197 
[1.84] 
lnCCS  it  0.081 
t  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  yes  yes  yes 
R 
2  0.976  0.976  0.976 
RMSE  0.088  0.088  0.088 
Number of observation  61  61  61 
Method  2LS  2LS  2LS 
Table 9  
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Sample: 26 European countries, 2000-2003 
 
Regression explaining share of non-employed in the working age 
population, Equation (3) 
 
E 
Dependent variable : 
Explanatory variable  ln NONEMP  it ln NONEMP  it  ln NONEMP  it ln NONEMP  it  ln NONEMP  it ln NONEMP  it 
total  total  male  male male  male 
(3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (3d)  (3e)  (3f) 
ln VAT  it-1  0.18 
[1.21] 
ln k  it-1  -0.18 
[-2.36] 
ln (VAT  it-1 *(10/ k)  it-1  ))  0.18 
[2.78] 
ln SELF  i t-1  0.013  0.014 
[0.30]  [0.38] 
ln AGR i t-1  0.061  0.092  0.053  0.075  0.021  0.021 
[2.47]  [4.66]  [2.83]  [5.65]  [0.76]  [0.77] 
ln U  it-1  0.098  0.17  0.22  0.27  0.23  0.23 
[2.79]  [4.28]  [5.52]  [7.59]  [5.29]  [5.85] 
CCS  it 
ln CCS  it  0.46  0.32 
[3.63]  [2.31] 
Dummy for t  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R 
2  0.6  0.52  0.7  0.68  0.73  0.73 
RMSE  0.1384  0.1515  0.1325  0.1339  0.1263  0.1252 
Number of ob.  63  63  63  63  63  63 
Method  2LS  2LS  2LS  2LS  2LS  2LS 












y = -0.7669x + 68.932 
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Figure 1 
The share of the non-observed economy in GDP and the total employment rate, percent, 











y = -1.2517x + 58.406 
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Figure 5 
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